Review of Hiroshi Uchida’s
Marx’s *Grundrisse* and Hegel’s *Logic* (1988)

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1.

Commentaries on the *Grundrisse* had been published by Japanese Marists as early as 1974 when Hiroshi Uchida’s commentary was published in 1988. Uchida was not only a scholar of Marx’s political economic writing, but also a scholar of Hegel and Aristotle. In the *Grundrisse*, according to Uchida, Marx was criticizing the political economists by means of a critique of Hegel because “Hegel adopts the standpoint of modern national economy” (Marx, 1844). Further, Hegel and Marx shared an admiration of Aristotle, but according to Marx, Hegel deformed Aristotle (p. 4), and Marx used Aristotle against Hegel particularly in order to develop his own materialism.

As Uchida tells it, however, in the course of criticising Hegel, Marx appropriates much of Hegel’s *Logic*. In particular, Marx learns from Hegel how capital reproduces the presuppositions for its own existence, and is in that sense an organic system. However, Marx’s central aim is to show how Hegel (and the political economists) obscure the *historical* origins of the conditions of their own existence and the limits of its own development. When cast in terms of logical categories, the social relations of capital appear for Hegel to be natural and eternal realities of human life. In fact, they are products of past history and are sowing the seeds of their own extinction. This is summed up in Marx’s *logico-historical* method. What later appears as the “tendency of the rate of profit to fall” appears in the *Grundrisse* in a form anticipating the theme of “expropriation of the expropriators” and the preparation of the conditions for Socialism.

In the *Grundrisse*, then, Marx’s debt to Hegel is quite explicit, whereas in later manuscripts the Hegel commentary is much reduced, evidently for the purpose of making the political economic critique more accessible. Uchida takes the reader through large swathes of the *Grundrisse* seeking to show paragraph-by-paragraph the text from the *Shorter Logic* with which Marx is engaged. According to Uchida:

> [Marx’s] “task in the *Grundrisse* therefore consists in demonstrating that the genesis of value and its development into capital are described in the *Logic*, albeit in a seemingly closed system which reproduces itself, and overall his work is directed towards transcending capitalism in practice.”

and

> the *Logic* is the most abstract philosophical expression of the bourgeois spirit or consciousness of value. This consciousness of value forms the basic economic relation of bourgeois society. (p. 4)

Uchida sees Marx tracing the development of value through the *Grundrisse*, from product, to commodity, to money in its successive guises as measure of value, means of exchange and hoard to merchant capital and industrial capital.
and gets as far as the particular forms of capital – “constant” and “variable” capital and finally its abolition by the transformation of capital into a single planned economy.

What is intriguing in Uchida’s retracing of the path of value from product to industrial capital is how the forms of value are mapped against the three books of the *Logic*. Despite what is suggested by the titles of Uchida’s chapters, the various transitions are not neatly located in separate books of the *Logic*.

Chapter 1 of Uchida’s book deals with the Introduction to the *Grundrisse*, and according to Uchida, Hegel’s “Doctrine of the Notion.” Then comes Chapter 2 on Money and Hegel’s “Doctrine of Being.” This is followed by the extensive “Chapter on Capital” which Uchida deals with in his third chapter subtitled “Doctrine of Essence.” That is, The *Grundrisse* has the order: Introduction, Money, Capital; Uchida maps this to the *Logic* in the order: Notion, Being, Essence. Whereas the *Logic* has the order Being, Essence, Notion. That is, according to the chapter *titles* in each work. But when we look at the *content*, the material Uchida places under each heading does not match the content of the chapter he links to in Hegel’s *Logic*.

These differences require us to attend to Hegel’s advice on *where to begin*, questions which Hegel only addresses in the last passages of the *Logic* devoted to a discussion of the method of the *Logic*. I will deal with this material last.

The first section heading in Uchida’s Chapter 2, on “Money and Being,” reads “Product, commodity and money, and ‘identity, difference, opposition and contradiction’ ‘Identity, Difference, Opposition and Contradiction’ are the “Moments of Reflection” in the *Logic*, concluding with ‘Ground’. These are the first moments of the first chapter of the Doctrine of Essence, Reflection. The chapter on Reflection is concluded with the pair Form and Matter, laying the basis for the chapter on Appearance and the chapter on Actuality, each of which are marked by *pairs* of concepts such as Content-and-Form, and Cause-and-Effect. The moments of Reflection are the analytical moments of the Doctrine of Essence, just as Being, Nothing, Becoming, Determinate Being and the One are the analytical moments of the Doctrine of Being. But Uchida says that the Moments of Reflection are the “transition from being to essence” (p. 31). But there is a section Hegel entitled “Transition into Essence” in the *Science of Logic* at least, it is not this. Reflection definitely falls under Essence. Being is *immediate*, and Reflection is self-evidently the *mediation* between Being and the Notion.

In my reading, the form of movement we see in Reflection is where one concept pushes another to the side and overtakes it, so to speak, but does not extinguish the former. When the resulting contradictions are resolved into Ground, which proves to be only a “deeper” contradiction, the movement displayed in Reflection gives way to a succession of *pairs* of concepts, each in turn pushing the other into the background. In Appearance, the middle chapter of Essence, the pair is form-and-content explicitly understood to be in contradiction, entailing a succession of forms being endlessly overtaken by their content and thereby new forms. The third and final chapter of Essence, Actuality, is similar in structure inasmuch as when Ground comes forward as Effect, it is disclosed.
as Cause, and in turn new effects, again in an endless series of cause-and-effect which never gets to the bottom of matters, a “bad infinity.” Marx of course reads this in economic terms, in the well-known opening passages of the Introduction to the *Grundrisse*.

As Uchida continues with this chapter he continues to reflect on the Moments of Reflection and cites a further link to the same section. After 5 pages, Uchida moves to the early moments of Being with the transition to Quantity, in which he makes a plausible link between Marx's use value and exchange-value and Hegel's Determinate Being and Being-for-itself, but no evidence of an actual textual link. Marx continues (in Uchida’s narrative) to talk about money as the substance of exchange-value, not just an ideal, and then refers again to “contradiction.” Indeed, Hegel speaks here of “contradiction,” but only the contradiction entailing the limit implied in singling out one determinate being from another. Hegel’s next mention of “contradiction” is extensive and repeated and is found in the Moments of Reflection, and it is here that Uchida should have been connecting to the contradiction arising with the reflection of the exchange value of a commodity, in money, another particular commodity, though it is possible Marx was here inspired by the Chapter on Measure. Uchida continues for some time along the same theme until citing Hegel again, this time in The Idea, the last chapter of the Doctrine of the Notion. Uchida now devotes himself to Marx’s comments on Substance, one of the last phases of Essence before the leap to the Notion.

Uchida then covers “Price and Quantum.” Quantum is indeed a category of Quantity in the Doctrine of Being, along with a number of other categories dealt with by Hegel in that same chapter, and Uchida cites the relevant passages. “One and the Many” dealt with next is indeed under Hegel’s “Being-for-Self.” After several pages still plausibly connected to Being, Marx returns (apparently) to the Moments of Reflection under Essence. Later there are references to the *Phenomenology*, before citing Marx on Substance (Actuality) and The Idea.

And so on. For the remainder of this chapter, Uchida finds cause to cite a couple of paragraphs near the end of the Doctrine of Being, but even more from the chapter on Reflection. It is indeed hard to talk about the quantification of commodities or their transformation into money without finding some relevant quotes from Being, especially Measure, the last chapter of the Doctrine of Being. However, the transformation of value from product to commodity to money is clearly relevant to Essence, and Reflection in particular. Assuming that Marx was indeed inspired by the Hegel passages Uchida points out, insofar as Marx was talking about money, what we see is that Marx was mostly interested in Reflection. The Doctrine of Being nonetheless would have attracted Marx’s attention in relation to the emergence of money as a measure of the value of commodities. But from Uchida’s examination, it seems that in his work on money, Marx took inspiration from every section of the *Logic* and the *Phenomenology*. I see no basis for the Chapter heading linking Money to Being. Products, the first form of value if we accept Uchida’s view of theme of the *Grundrisse* being the transforms of forms of value beginning with the qualitative “commodity,” but Measure (such as 5 yards of linen), the last chapter of Being, is not yet money, but Measure generates the contradictions which then
give rise to Reflection and the successive changes in the Form of Value. When we say: “5 yards of linen = 2 pounds” this is not Measure, but Reflection.

The reason for making this rather tedious point is that in recent times the question of which section of Capital reflects which section of the Logic has become a central matter of dispute. From the actual evidence Uchida provides, if the Chapter on Money “corresponds to” any section of the Logic at all, it is Reflection. As money changes from a measure of value to a means of circulation to commercial capital to industrial capital, without abolishing the previous form of value, this is classic Reflection in Hegel’s terms.

3

Chapter 3 of Uchida’s book is entitled: “The Chapter on Capital and the Doctrine of Essence,” but the title is immediately followed by the subheading: “Part One. The Generality of Capital.” A later subheading refers to “Substance,” and “Relation of Substantiality” clearly referencing the second and third chapters of Essence. About half way through the Chapter, there is another subheading “Component Parts of Capital and ‘the whole and the parts’, and then ‘Force and its Manifestation’. All the Hegel quotes confirm this connection. But after the subheading about ‘Force’ we see Marx taking up the Particularisation of capital, which in the Grundrisse is based on what later became “variable” and “constant” capital, and ‘surplus capital’ enters the narrative along with primitive accumulation. Uchida continues to connect Marx’s concerns about the forms of Capital and cites sections mainly from the Chapter on Actuality (Cause-and-Effect and Substance). This completes Marx’s “critique of political economy is the genesis of the two ‘forms’, value and capital.” (p. 93)

And Uchida comments:

In economic relations, according to Marx, results or effects turn into presuppositions or causes. His model of an organic system of circular self-reproduction depends on Hegel’s account of ‘causality’.

(p. 99)

However, Uchida does not see that the systematic reproduction of its own presuppositions is what is characteristic of an organism, not of the bad infinity of Causality represented in the Doctrine of Essence. It is the Doctrine of the Notion which represents the logic of an organic system, as described in the transition from Subject to Object.

The final section of the book is an outline of the three critiques of Hegel’s Logic which Marx has exposed in the Grundrisse. I will return to this later.

What we see in the Chapter on Capital is, I think, correctly linked to the latter parts of Essence, but there is also clear allusions to the first two moments of the Notion, universality and particularity, though these moments arise in the narrative in a manner clearly relevant to the main lines of the argument for ‘transition from money to capital’. Overall, Uchida’s claim that the Grundrisse’s theme is the transition from product, to money to capital, is confirmed by his textual analysis, and consequently, in the main, both chapters 2 and 3 “correspond” to the Logic of Essence, with the proviso that Being is relevant to only the first phase, product, while the transition from substance to Notion
necessarily entails a reference to the logic of the Notion as the outcome, not itself part of the Doctrine of Essence.

4.

Chapter One of Uchida’s book is titled: “The Introduction to the Grundrisse and the "Doctrine of the Notion"

Uchida is quite correct to begin from the Notion in his study of the Grundrisse. Hegel recommends that the logical order of analysis and synthesis of a phenomenon is to begin from the concept, but in the form of a “universal individual” and to proceed from there to particularity. I have chosen to trace the path of value from product to capital which Uchida claims is Marx’s main theme in the Grundrisse, the better to be able to trace the correspondence of the path of value to the path of cognition in the Logic from Being to Essence to Notion. This, however, has put me at odds with Uchida’s own order of presentation.

When we look at the content of the Logic of the Notion, it is really only its first chapter in which we would expect to find ground-breaking work on capital, because the second Chapter of the Logic of the Notion is to do with the interaction of capital with non-capital activities, and the final chapters outline the methodology of the Logic and then summarises the whole of the Logic. Only the first section of the Notion, the Subject, represents capital as such.

So what topics does the Introduction to the Grundrisse actually deal with? I will follow Uchida’s commentary here.

Marx begins with defining the subject matter as production in general which Uchida connects to the first section of The Idea (though effectively the final section as the following sections of the Idea deal only with the method of the Logic), in which Hegel deals likewise with life-in-general. As Uchida points out, Marx is here laying out his main line of critique of Hegel and the political economists – they all treat the activities of individuals in abstraction from the historically determined social context, namely capital. Marx further alleges that Hegel treats the human being as simply a “being,” without taking account of the human mind, as if mind and body were separate. In fact, Hegel deals with both these issues in what he sees as the appropriate place, “Objective Spirit,” but Marx’s point rests on his claim that, unconsciously, both Hegel and the political economists have naturalised logic as if it were a timeless reflection of “human nature.” Likewise, Hegel naturalises a range of social behaviour, including gender relations, divisions of labour and private property. This rupture between mind and material is reflected in the vulgar materialism of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, and Hegel’s Idealism. Hegel’s Idealism leads to Hegel’s adopting the capitalists’ value-consciousness and expressing this consciousness in logic, with value as an active and knowing Subject.

Uchida writes: “As we will see later in detail, the 'subject' in the Doctrines of Being and of Essence is an ideal subject par excellence” (p. 13). “Subject” is not an explicit category of these two books which constitute the “genesis of the Notion.” The Subject is the first chapter of the Notion. Undoubtedly the subject in the Objective Logic is ideal, but it seems odd to me to describe such a subject as “ideal par excellent” given that is not yet fully self-conscious.
Marx then proceeds to critique the fundamental concepts of political economy in a pair-wise fashion, such as exchange-and-production, demonstrating how each of the political economists grasp these pairs in a one-sided way, reflecting the standpoint of different sections of the capitalist class. In this trope, Marx is unquestionably utilising Hegelian techniques of criticism illustrated in the Doctrine of Essence. Marx further goes on to criticise Hegel’s conception of ‘life’.

Method of Political Economy

Uchida considers the section entitled “Method of Political Economy” to be very important in identifying the ascending method (from concrete to abstract) as reflecting the method of the earliest writers such as Wm. Petty and reflective of Hegel’s analytical method as described in the latter section of The Idea, and that method of Adam Smith and the later political economists, building a system of political economy, by ascending from the simplest, most abstract determinations to a concrete, conceptual representation of the whole. This distinction is explained in the penultimate sections of the Idea. Marx says that the synthetic method is the “scientifically correct one,” and

“In Marx’s work this is reflected in the triadic composition of the Chapter on Capital in the Grundrisse as I. Generality of Capital, II. Particularity of Capital, III. Individuality of Capital”

reflecting the Moments of the Subject in the Doctrine of the Notion, and that

“What Hegel says in ‘the development of the moments of the notion’ signifies for Marx that reality is mentally reproduced and appropriated as the concrete concept. This is a totality of manifold determinations in the mind, so categories in the Doctrine of Being become presuppositions of the notion of capital, and categories in the Doctrine of Essence develop from generality or the ‘notion’ itself, towards particularity or judgment, and up to individuality or syllogism. Marx thus turns the two doctrines of the objective logic into objective moments of the mental reproduction of the concrete. This reflects Hegel’s triad – generality, particularity, individuality – in the Doctrine of the Notion” (p. 21).

This is confusing. Firstly, Uchida agrees that the correct method is Hegel’s synthetic method and is reflected in the Grundisse’s Chapter on Capital, which he characterizes as Reflecting the Logic of Essence, and then states that these are moments, not of Essence, but of the Notion, while including the moments of the Subjective Notion as falling under Essence. Further, Marx has agreed that these moments reflect real historical moments and uses them himself in his logical representation of the capitalist system. Uchida does not recognise the “leaps” in the Logic from Being to Reflection (as part of Essence), and from Essence to Subject (as part of the Notion). Effectively he moves each boundary one chapter forward.

Uchida’s criticism here that, according to Marx, Hegel thinks that the real process of development of the concrete follows the same path as the logical development of the concrete in the mind. Both writers take it that the object exists outside of the individual mind. However. Hegel takes it that the alienation of the ideal is the natural process of development of bourgeois relations, whereas Marx sees the process of subjection of individuals to these relations
which exist in the social realities in which people live, because of a social division of labour in which the mental rules over the physical. Hegel is not aware that the process of alienation is itself an historical product of this division of labour. Smith and Ricardo, on the other hand, “unconsciously reify or transubstantiate value-consciousness into material products” as “vulgar materialists” (p. 23).

As Marx follows Adam Smith in defining the “simplest” categories as “exchange-value, possession, money, exchange and labour in general,” but he traces the historical origins of these through the pre-capitalist development of the form of value, chiefly money.

Here Uchida points to Hegel’s view of development as a “circle,” the starting point of the “simplest determinations” is also the endpoint of the analysis, the conceptual concrete, and Uchida reminds us that the German word for Essence, *Wesen*, relates to *Dasein* as “being” relates to “was.” Uchida sees here a reference to the cycle: capital – product – commodity – money – capital; i.e., forms of existence of value. Uchida takes this as affirmation of the characterisation of the movement of capital as *Essence*. The question arises for Marx, however, is whether the first pre-positing was made by capital (as would be consistent with Hegel’s notion of a “circle” or whether on the contrary the presuppositions of capital were posited historically by pre-capitalist formations. Is capital a “self-moving subject” or is it historical (and therefore transitory) in form?

As Uchida has shown, Marx adopts a logico-historical method which is concerned with historical he origins of the logical presuppositions of bourgeois society. Later on in the Chapter on Capital, Uchida points out that Marx investigates primitive accumulation and the changing form of money from means of circulation, hoard, and finally capital. Uchida expresses this with the aphorism:

> Marx reads the *Logic* as the phenomenology or genesis of the value-consciousness described in the *Chapter on Money* and the *Chapter on Capital* in the *Grundrisse*. (p. 25)

Hegel saw his *Phenomenology* as the preface to his system as outlined in the *Logic* and the *Encyclopaedia*, and it seems that Uchida invites us to see these parts of the *Grundrisse* in the same way. These chapters correspond to Being and Essence according to Uchida, which Hegel calls the “Objective Logic,” or the *genesis* of the Notion, logically prior to the Subject becoming self-conscious. By simply participating in exchange, buyers and sellers unconsciously share their value-consciousness and reify value as money.

Further, Marx’s logico-historical method leads to Marx’s speculative reflections on the developing consciousness of the working class. He follows on here in the Introduction through his analysis of tendencies he sees within the capitalist system itself. These reflections belong within a *logical, speculative critique* of the notion of capital itself. I believe that Uchida fails to adequately distinguish between the historical pre-conditions of capital, the logical genesis of the concept of capital and analysis of the concept of capital itself including the speculative critique of this concept. Equally, he has failed to distinguish between Being which is serial and immediate, Essence in which everything is relative
and the Notion which is organic development. In a first draft of what became *Capital*, there was no reason for Marx to separate out these aspects of his work into separate chapters reflecting these distinctions, but I think it is incumbent on later commentators to do so, and based on evidence.

Uchida then points out that the plan drawn up by Marx at this point reflects Hegel’s method in that it begins from the general and simple, through “external considerations,” to Particularity, and then remarks that this structure is “manifested throughout the Chapter on Capital,” contradicting his claim in the final chapter of his book that the Chapter on Capital in the *Grundrisse* is reflective of Hegel’s doctrine of Essence.

I should mention here, as an aside, that the only reference to Individuality in the *Grundrisse* is when Marx refers to the individual capital, i.e., the individual capitalist firm, not an individual person.

Uchida sums up his analysis of the *Grundrisse* by outlining three principal lines of Marx’s critique of Hegel, which he entitles the Generality, Particularity and Individuality of Capital, mimicking Hegel’s Moments of the Notion.

a. Generality of Capital

Marx’s first line of critique of Hegel is whether capital generates a closed circle in the form of a chain of causality which forms an eternal circular movement or whether the conditions for the existence of capital are historical products which are eventually negated by capitalism itself. Marx agrees with Hegel’s view of “circular causality” (Reciprocity and Absolute Necessity) which is in fact the final phase of the Doctrine of Essence. He likens the emergence of value-consciousness associated with the changing forms of value as money with Hegel’s *Phenomenology*. The demise of capitalism which is anticipated in the growing self-consciousness of the proletariat arises from contradictions within the logic of capital.

The transition from money to capital is mediated by the pre-capitalist economic formations in which Marx traces the origins of the presuppositions for capital:

- free exchange,
- free labour-power,
- free funds and
- the accumulation of money.

In that sense Marx shows that capitalism is a logico-historical system that is open, in contrast with Hegel’s logical system that is closed and timeless. Uchida likens the historical emergence of capitalism to Hegel’s *Phenomenology* and Hegel’s Objective Logic: Being and Essence.

Uchida however has blurred the distinction between Essence, which can go no further than an infinite chain of causality, and the Notion which transcends this bad infinity, characteristic of Essence, as a Notion which has the character of an Organic, self-reproducing whole with its three Moments. Marx agrees that capital is such a self-reproducing whole, but its capacity for self-reproduction is
finite, and its presuppositions were first produced by pre-capitalist formations and primitive accumulation.

This openness was in fact exhibited in Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature* and the *Subjective Spirit*, but is absent from the *Logic* and the *Philosophy of Right*. Note also, that regarding the “Method of Political Economy,” both Uchida and Marx at this point have missed the fact that Hegel’s logic is both synthetic and analytical. Synthesis presupposes analysis

b. Particularity of Capital

Following this consideration of the ‘generality’ of capital, Marx moves to the particularity of capital which Uchida identifies in Marx’s examination of the logic of capital in the distinction between fixed and circulating capital, and again, we see Marx showing that the presuppositions for this particularisation are found in pre-capitalist formations, and the extinction of these conditions found in the logic of capital. Here the particularity leads to the social accumulation of large amount of surplus or “disposable time,” a concept which Marx appropriated from an 18th century economist. Thus Marx also identifies the appearance of the concept of *relative surplus value* and the prospect of a decrease in the general rate of profit, and with this, the education of the working class and the growing redundancy of the capitalist.

Again we see a combination of historicism (absent from the *Logic*) and logical analysis, appropriated from the *Logic* but with Marx highlighting the contradictions within the supposedly closed system of capital, laying the preconditions for socialism.

c. Individuality of Capital

When Uchida refers to the “III. The Individuality of Capital,” he cites various sections of the last Notebook which are indexed by the translator mostly under “Miscellaneous.” It could be related to the historical origins of industrial capital identified by Marx: the transformation of independent producers into wage-labourers; the organisation of wage labourers into manufacture, and the transformation of merchant capital into industrial capital, and subsequently its own abolition.

Thus, Uchida may see “Individuality of capital” as referring to capital moving “from a whole to ‘one determinate totality’ [reveals] the real possibility of practical transcendence,” the final outcome of this logic-historical development of capital in which the proletariat takes political power and plans economic development. So, the “Individual” moment of capital refers to the capitalist system’s final destiny as a single planned economy controlled by the working class.

The drift of the critique that Marx makes of Hegel dealt with in this section is this: that “Hegel’s idealism is not merely philosophical speculation, but rather a real expression of the relations of modern private property – a philosophical expression of its own economic background, i.e. the relation of value and capital, the basic relation of modern bourgeois society” (p. 138). Consequently, the relations which Hegel takes as confined to moments of cognition, Marx sees as characterising real moments of the development of value. Marx sees a metaphor which shows how this is possible:
“Marx critically suggests that Hegel’s *Logic*, in which an ideal subject or ‘idea’ appears to posit itself and all other objects, is similar to political economy, in which value and capital do likewise” (p. 138).

In Marx’s own words:

Therefore, to the kind of consciousness – and this is characteristic of the philosophical consciousness – for which conceptual thinking is the real human being, and for which the conceptual world as such is thus the only reality, the movement of the categories appears as the real act of production ... this is correct in so far as the concrete totality is a totality of thoughts, concrete in thought, in fact a product of thinking and comprehending; but not in any way a product of the concept which thinks and generates itself outside or above observation and conception; a product, rather, of the working-up of observation and conception into concepts. The totality as it appears in the head, as a totality of thoughts, is a product of a thinking head, which appropriates the world in the only way it can, a way different from the artistic, religious, practical and mental appropriation of this world. The real subject retains its autonomous existence outside the head just as before; namely as long as the head’s conduct is merely speculative, merely theoretical. Hence, in the theoretical method, too, the subject, society, must always be kept in mind as the presupposition. (1973, p. 101)

**Conclusion**

Uchida has left us in no doubt how extensively Marx was both appropriating and criticising Hegel’s *Logic* and developing his philosophical materialism while engaged with the political economists. However, to abstract from this work which parts of the *Logic* are implicated in which parts of his critique of political economy it is necessary to look closely at which paragraphs of the *Logic* Marx is referencing as they do not correspond to what is implicated by Uchida’s chapter headings. Equally, the chapter headings of the *Grundisse* do not map nicely on to what became the volumes of *Capital*. Marx’s plans for *Capital* constantly changed over 10 years between writing the *Grundrisse* and writing *Capital*.

Uchida claims that Marx is aiming to disclose the dynamics of capital by means of a logico-historical tracing of value from product to commodity to money to capital and subsequently to different components of capital and, speculatively, to the transformation of value to a single social whole following the overthrow of capital. This claim is well-made.

Uchida’s identification of Marx’s lines of critique are well established by Uchida, viz.,

- that, by naturalising human practice and ignoring the genesis of practice which *produced* the presuppositions of both capital and the *Logic*, Hegel mistook historical product for an eternal circle of reproduction of capital.

- that while revealing real dynamics of human practice in his *Logic*, Hegel fails to realise that these practices are products of history, in turn the source of the philosopher’s abstractions.
that Hegel has failed to identify the contradictions with the capitalist “organism,” which Marx is able to reveal by appropriating Hegel's logical method.

Uchida cites the letter from Marx to Hegel of 16 January 1858:

it has given me great service that by mere accident I had again leafed through Hegel's Logic – Freiligrath found some volumes ...
and sent me them as a present.(p. 1)

At the time of writing this letter, the Grundrisse would have been more than half written. Uchida reminds us that Marx was continuously engaged with Hegel in his work throughout the 1840s, before his exile to Britain in 1850 when he began his economic studies. It may well be that after an 8-year absence of Hegel from his concerns this letter triggered a thought. However, it hardly explains Marx's extensive references to Hegel throughout 1857-58, writing the Grundrisse.

References
